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A Two Level Anti-Monoply Law*
Edward H. Levit
T HE antitrust law with respect to monopoly appears to be de-
veloping on two levels, in part no doubt because of an uncer-
tainty as to what monopoly is or how it is to be recognized. At
one level, monopoly itself is deemed illegal monopolizing without
any showing of abuses.1 At the other level, power together with its
use in a particular way must be shown. The so-called integration
cases are to be found at both levels. Where monopoly power itself
is deemed illegal, the assumption may be that monopoly, since it
gives to the entrepreneur the power to change prices by curtailing
his own production, inevitably leads to higher than competitive
prices. The abuse theory is much more likely to emphasize conduct
injurious to competitors, and so prices which are too low may cause
illegality. The assumption behind the abuse theory is often stated
to be that such exclusionary tactics have as their purpose the en-
joyment of monopoly once it is achieved. Whatever the rationale,
the abuse theory is developing into a vague system of law restrict-
ing the activities of large enterprises, or enterprises so situated
that they are deemed to have monopoly power although the power
itself may not be illegal.
Illegality of Monopoly without Abuse
The theory of the illegality of monopoly without abuse rests on
the Alcoa case,2 decided by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. The relative size deemed monopoly was production or con-
trol of over 90% of the relevant market. The court stated it wds
*An address given January 18, 1952, before the Chicago Bar Association Corr-
feience on the Antitrust Laws.
t Dean, Univeisity of Chicago Law School.
1. The implication of the theory of power as illegal monopolizing, including its
possible application to industries where more than one but a relatively few firms
control a large portion of the market, may be traced in the following articles: Levi,
The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 153 (1947); Rostow,
The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. oF CH I. L. REv.
567 (1947) ; Harbeson, A New Phase of the Antitrust Law, 45 MIcH. L. REv. 977(1947); Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose? 43 IU.
L. RFv. 745 (1949) ; Johnston and Stevens, Monopoly or Monopolization-A Reply
to Professor Rostow, 44 ILL. L. RaV. 269 (1949); Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-
Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743 (1950).
2. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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doubtful, thinking no doubt of the International Harvester case,3
whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough, and concluded
that "certainly thirty-three percent" would not be. The automaticity
of the percentage test, possibly implied by the Learned Hand
opinion, has been alleviated by the general statement of the Su-
preme Court in the Columbia Steel case4 where it was said, "We
do not undertake to prescribe any set of percentage figures." The
factors there set forth to be examined were: "the percentage of
business controlled, the strength of the remaining competition.
whether the action springs from business requirement or purpose
to monopolize, the probable developments of the industry, consumer
demands, and other characteristics of the market." These broad
standards, among others, were applied by Judge Knox in the re-
mand of Alcoa. Despite the result in Columbia Steel, there is reason
to believe that these standards suggest not that 90% control would
be inadequate by itself to spell illegality, but that, on the contrary,
under some circumstances, 64% and even 33% might bring into
play some of the anti-monopoly restrictions of the antitrust laws.
The significant step taken by the Alcoa opinion is in its finding
of monopolizing independent of illegal acts, despite the price
squeeze, or of any monopolistic purpose, other than a purely formal
one, and where the size has been achieved without combination.
Chief Justice White's much quoted paragraph in the old Standard
Oil case5 that size gives rise, "to say the least, to the prima facie pre-
sumption of intent and purpose" to monopolize does not go as far
as the Alcoa case because the size in Standard Oil was achieved
through combination. 6 The International Harvester and United
States Steel cases, although variously interpreted, furthered the
belief that even with combination, if abusive acts or purposes were
abandoned sufficiently prior to the bringing of the antitrust action,
the Government would lose its cause or would at least go remedi-
less. The kind of remedy perhaps available is suggested by the
unaccepted offer of the District Court in the United States Steel
case to retain jurisdiction so that if illegal acts were resumed, they
then could be restrained.7 Judge Cochran in Patterson v. United
States,8 prior to these cases, had in fact said that "monopolizing
ceases whenever the pugnacious competitor ceases to fight" and
thereafter "holding onto the spoils of victory" is not monopolizing.
3. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
4. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948).
5. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911).
6. Cf. Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose, 43 ILi.
L. REv. 745, 754-755 (1949).
7. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 445 (1920); id.,
223 Fed. 55, 161 (D.N.J. 1915).
8. Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599, 625 (6th Cir. 1915).
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Judge Hand's opinion removes combination, illegal acts, or intent,
past or present, as indispensable elements in the crime of monopo-
lizing, although of course the exception in favor of those who have
become monopolists by accident and have had monopoly thrust
upon them is there to be enlarged.9
Judge Hand arrived at his conclusion in part by analogizing the
power of the individual monopolist to the power inherent in price
fixing conspiracies. That portion of Hand's opinion together with
his statement that the exclusion of competitors would result from
the monopolist embracing new opportunities, and was not to be
limited to maneuvers "not honestly industrial," was quoted with
approval by the Supreme Court in the second Tobacco case.10 Since
that case involved a jury finding of monopolization by three tobacco
companies, each of which produced considerably less than one third
of the national domestic cigarette production, but which were found
to have been linked together in a combination or conspiracy to
monopolize, the possible implications of the Alcoa decision in the
so-called oligopoly area were immediately apparent. For if in such
areas the power possessed by the relatively few dominating com-
panies, having common practices could be aggregated, the coverage
of the combined power over the market might well be as in tobacco,
between 60% and 80%, and in some cases higher.
The concert of action doctrine of Interstate Circuit," to say
nothing of conscious parallelism, would make easier the finding of
conspiracy on which such an aggregation could be based. The
Paramount case gave some support to this theory. The District
Court had first found that the five major producers distributing
and exhibiting films could not be treated collectively to establish
claims of general monopolization in exhibition.' 2 The Supreme
Court, noting that there had been a finding of an attempt to monop-
olize in the fixing of prices, granting of unreasonable clearances,
block booking, and other restraints found unlawful, sent the case
back for a determination of what the results of the conspiracy were
in the first-run field nationally or by localities.'3 Upon the remand
9. 148 F.2d at 429-431.
10. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813, 814 (1946).
11. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). At 226, Mr.justice Stone states: "While the District Court's finding of an agreement of the
distributors among themselves is supported by the evidence, we think that in the
circumstances of this case such agreement for the imposition of restrictions upon
subsequent-run exhibitors was not a prerequisite to an unlawful conspiracy. It was
enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited, the dis-
tributors gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it." See United
States v. Masonite Corporation, 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942); Sunderland, Changing
Legal Concepts in the Antitrust Field, 3 SYRACUSE L. REV. 60, 68 et seq. (1951).
12. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp. 323, 353 et seq. (S.D. N.Y.
1946).
13. 334 U.S. 131, 168-175 (1948).
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of this case, the District Court explained14 that its original findings
had been made in the light of the remedies it had proposed. It now
held "in respect to monopoly power, we think it existed in this case
. ..the defendants were all working together."' 5 In its original
opinion, it had said that "in about 60 percent of the 92 cities having
population of over 100,000, on which the government mainly relies
to prove its case, there are independent first-run theatres in com-
petition with those of the major defendants, except so far as it may
be restricted by the trade practices that we have criticized."' 6 It
now said, "if viewed collectively the major defendants owned in
1945 at least 70 percent of the first run theatres in the 92 largest
cities and the Supreme Court has noted that they owned 60 percent
of the first run theatres in cities with populations between 25,000
and 100,000. As distributors, they received approximately 73 per-
cent of the domestic film rentals from the films except Westerns,
distributed in the 1943-44 season. These figures certainly indicate,
when coupled with the strategic advantages of vertical integration,
a power to exclude competitors from these markets when desired."'
17
Accordingly, it ordered divestiture of exhibition from production
and distribution.
Thus starting with the Alcoa opinion, and continuing through
Tobacco, Paramount, and Columbia Steel, the antitrust laws have
been brought into more direct relationship to the problem of size,
whether the relative size of one company which dominates, or the
domination by a few, and also to what is deemed to be the problem
of integration. The direction of the Hand opinion was to remove
from the monopoly achieved case, the questions of intent and abuse.
The emergence of the Alcoa theory of illegality per se in the mo-
nopoly field necessarily raises questions as to the status of the older
cases which proceeded on an abuse theory, and of the comparatively
few recent cases which emphasize the way power has been used
rather than the existence of the power itself. The abuse theory
standing by itself was a different theory than one which now ac-
companies and supplements a doctrine of illegality per se. It ap-
pears that Alcoa has not destroyed the abuse theory, although it
has changed it, perhaps by setting an upper limit for monopoly
power, or by making it necessary to recognize that, contrary to the
implications of Alcoa, in some areas monopoly power is lawful as
long as it is properly used. A concomitant of this is the recognition
that where there is size, there may be restrictions on its use, even
14. 85 F. Supp. 881, 886 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
15. Id. at 894.
16. 66 F. Supp at 354.
17. 85 F. Supp. at 894.
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though in the particular case no court will deem the size by itself
(in accordance with Alcoa) to be illegal. A kind of public utility
or unfair competition theory thus is a part of the abuse theory.
Continued Existence of Abuse Theory
The continued existence of an abuse theory is shown by the fact
that the second Tobacco case, despite the deference paid by it to
Alcoa, refers to Alcoa as involving the use of unlawful means to
establish or maintain a monopoly.1 8 Moreover the second Tobacco
case rests on a finding of conspiracy, which in addition to avoiding
the problem of monopoly unwittingly thrust upon an enterprise,
also can import into the proceeding questions of intent.19 The ques-
tions of purpose and normal business conduct are re-established as
of importance by the enumeration of standards in the Columbia
Steel case. Undoubtedly the continuing vitality of the abuse theory
is based in part on a recognition that there is a kind of legerdemain,
which cannot be helped, when the percentage test to find illegal size
is applied. A more striking difficulty with the size illegal in itself
theory is that the law will not entirely accept as its standard for
determining what size should be illegal the standard implicit in
Alcoa; namely, that size which gives the enterprise the power to
change prices by curtailing its own production. This leaves a gap
which the abuse theory must fill. So far as cases are concerned,
the emerging abuse theory rests on two of the cases from which
Alcoa itself grew; the Corn Products20 and the Swift cases.21 These
are supplemented by the Atlantic and Pacific case2 2 the remand of
the Alcoa case,23 the Griffith case,24 and the Lorain Journal case. 25
The modern abuse theory runs into difficulty when it is asked
whether it is based in application on a finding of intent, or of effect,
or the use of specific devices. The lack of clarity in this respect
gives the law a flexibility which emphasizes that if it can be said
that the antitrust laws are developing so as to have one law for the
large and another for the small, this is more likely to be found to be
so, as an effective matter, where the abuse theory is applied, with
its growing restrictions on the use of size, than in the more limited
area of Alcoa.
18. 328 U.S. 781, 786 (1946).
19. See Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact: I, 58
YALE L. J. 1019 (1949).
20. United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D. N.Y. 1916).
21. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
22. United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79
(7th Cir. 1949).
23. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
24. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
25. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
1952]
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Difficulties in the Application of Relative Size Theory
The application of the illegality per se of size is difficult because
the automaticity of the percentage test is illusory. The percentage
test by itself requires an evaluation of market conditions. Monop-
oly control is only meaningful in terms of a market area and for
designated products. It may seem automatic to have results follow
a calculation, but the calculation itself is a battle-ground reflect-
ing arguments as to the market. In the old American Can case, 26
the court based its percentage on a market excluding, in the main,
cans which were made for concerns for their own use; by this
means, as the court was aware, one third of the cans were elimi-
nated from the calculation. As is well known, Judge Hand got away
from the doubtful figure of 64% in the Alcoa case, by excluding
secondary aluminum. In the Columbia Steel case, the percentage
figure chosen by the Court was that Consolidated's purchase of
rolled steel products, using the eleven state market area, was only
three percent. It would perhaps have been more reasonable to have
limited "this to plates and shapes which would have brought the
percentage up to 13%, or for the nine state area up to approxi-
mately 21%, or, if limited to California plate purchases then up to
34% in 1937. Using figures after 1937, the percentages would run
considerably higher, and for plates alone in the eleven state area
might get up as high as 48%o.
The difficulties inherent in the percentage test can be seen in
the handling of the relief in the Alcoa case. The exclusion of
secondary aluminum by Judge Hand was accomplished by point-
ing out that the secondary had come from Alcoa, and that if Alcoa
"was as far sighted as it proclaims itself, ' 27 Alcoa in producing
ingot today would take into account the amount which would
come back later as secondary. A less subtle analysis might go on
the basis that at any one time, Alcoa must find itself competing
with whatever will come out. It is not clear whether Hand's
analysis was intended to be factual in this regard, or a kind of
legal conclusion. His citation of the legal rule that a patentee may
not control a patented item after he has sold it, and yet is deemed
to have a monopoly on it, points in the direction of a general legal
rule. But Judge Knox in applying the opinion to the determination
of relief chose to take the question of ability to control the quantity
of secondary aluminum produced by Alcoa as a question of fact.2 8
He therefore decided that since Alcoa had not been producing for
war production, it could not limit its output in the same way as it
26. United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859, 899 (D. Md. 1916).
27. 148 F.2d at 425.
28. 91 F. Supp. at 357 et seq.
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might have done previously, and that therefore it did not exercise
that kind of control over secondary which, in the market calculation
would remove secondary as competing material controlled by others.
Having decided that much, Judge Knox then appears to abandon the
percentage test. If he had held to the percentage test, with second-
ary regarded as competing and had included Aluminium Limited's
production of primary aluminum in the total given to Alcoa, he
would have arrived at the uneasy figure of 64%. On the other hand,
if he had combined the production of the two companies, and had
not included secondary as a competitive factor in the market, he
would have had an argument for the disposition by the share-
holders of Alcoa of their stock interests in either Alcoa or Alumin-
ium (which he in fact ordered), because Alcoa and Aluminium
together had 70o of the 1948 production of primary aluminum.
This figure is arrived at by including the total Aluminium produc-
tion; it would be diminished to 58%, however, if only that Canadian
production expected to come into the United States market were
included.
The difficulties inherent in the application of the percentage
test arise in part precisely because the analysis of production or
capacity control must be in terms of a particular market and the
competitive forces within it. The application of the monopoly
concept on an illegality per se basis is therefore not simplified by
the broadening analysis of Justice Reed in the Columbia Steel case
or by the doctrine of workable or effective competition set forth
by Judge Knox in the remand of the Alcoa case.29 There is a further
problem in that the percentage of control which makes for illegal-
ity is uncertain, and so far as it is certain does not embrace the
same amount of power which the underlying rationale would
have it cover. An eminent economist, firmly committed to the pres-
ervation of the competitive system, once wrote, "one may suggest
tentatively, that in major industries no ownership unit should
produce or control more than five percent of the total output. ' 30
The law has not adopted, and, it is safe to say, will not adopt, with-
out further legislation, any such embracing standard, although it
may be recalled that little more than five percent was involved in
the combined purchases which made for price fixing illegality
in the Socony-Vacuum case.31 A law which uneasily permits great
relative size and bigness, but with a lack of assurance as to where
monopoly power is to be found moves naturally to a restriction on
29. Id. at 340.
30. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 319 (1948). See Hale, Size
and Shape: The Individual Enterprise as a Monopoly, [1950] U. OF ILL. L. FORUm
515.
31. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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the use of permitted power. Perhaps for small industries the per-
centage of control may be higher with legality than with the large
or major industries. The doctrine of the Alcoc case carries with
it the suggestion of such a division in the exemption which it per-
mits for the enterprise which has had monopoly thrust upon it, as,
for example, where a market is "so limited that it is impossible to
produce at all and meet the cost of production except by a plant
large enough to supply the whole demand. '3 2 Thus for some in-
dustries and for some markets, even the single firm may be all
that is expected. At all events the uncertainties of the law with
respect to the relevance in a monopoly proceeding of bigness which
carries with it great power, although the relative size of the par-
ticular enterprise within the market may not be outlawed auto-
matically, is an invitation for the continuation and creation of a
law of regulated activity and of unfair competition.
Concern of the Act with Size and Its Abuse
The Antitrust Act has, of course, always been concerned with
the problem of bigness and the abuse of permitted size. This is
no new lreoccupation, and it goes beyond an inquiry into relative
size within a defined market. The old suggestion that there might
be one law for the large and another for the small is old. As early
as 1904, in his dissent in the Northern Securities case,33 Justice
Holmes wrote critically of what he termed "a natural feeling that
somehow or other the statute meant to strike at combinations great
enough to cause anxiety on the part of those who love their country
more than money, while it views such little ones as I have supposed
with just indifference. This notion, it may be said somehow
breathes from the pores of the Act, although it seems to be con-
tradicted in every way by the words in detail. And it has occurred
to me that it might be that when a combination reaches a certain
size it might have attributed to it more of the character of a
monopoly merely by virtue of its size than would be attributed to
a smaller one." He found that argument inapplicable to the case
at hand because great size was inevitable for railroads, the com-
binations which made them were presumably not formed for the
purpose of excluding others, and finally even "a small railroad
will have the same tendency to exclude others" as would a great
one.
The Act has been concerned with the behavior of large scale
enterprise not merely from the standpoint of its ability to raise
32. 148 F.2d at 430.
33. 193 U.S. 197, 407, 408 (1904).
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prices by curtailing its own production which is the central theme
of the Alcoa opinion, but also from the standpoint of the ability
and tendency of the enterprise to charge prices deemed too low,
which is one earmark of the abuse or unfair competition theory.
Price wars were, of course, one of the abuses charged against the
older monopolies. In the Trans-Missouri Freight Association case,34
Justice Peckham, writing about price fixing combinations, said "In
this light it is not material that the price of an article be lowered. It
is in the power of the combination to raise it, and the result in any
event is unfortunate for the country by depriving it of the services
of a large number of small but independent dealers, who were
familiar with the business and who had spent their lives in it, and
who supported themselves and their families from the small profits
realized therein." One item against the American Tobacco Com-
pany was that it had lowered the price of plug below its cost.85 In
the second Tobacco case, the Court reports that the combination
lowered the price of cigarettes to diminish the competition of the
ten-cent brands.3 6
The Corn Products case is remembered today chiefly because of
Judge Hand's statement "the opinions of the Supreme Court cer-
tainly seem to indicate" that it is the power of a combination and
not its exercise which is the test of its legality37-the precursor of
his position in the Alcoa case. The opinion, however, is mostly
devoted to showing monopolistic intent and effect, or, in other
words, abuses. As to intent, Judge Hand was aided, because as he
said, "the officers of the Corn Products Refining Company appar-
ently had a custom of communicating with each other by type-
written, unsigned memoranda."38 He remarked that these memor-
anda were preserved "for some strange reason," and "it may be
safely assumed that evidence such as was by chance available
here of the actual purposes of those in charge will never again
exist." Further as to the intent and the effect, and perhaps use of
power, he found that the "defendants having control of the prices
at which glucose and starch could be manufactured, lowered prices
to a sum less than a fair profit, for the purpose of securing.the
trade to themselves, and harassing, annoying and, if possible,
driving out their competitors." 39 Significantly Judge Hand found
the defendants had power to lower prices as distinguished from
the power to raise them.40 In the International Harvester case,
34. 166 U.S. 290, 324 (1897).
35. 221 U.S. 106, 160, 182 (1911).
36. 328 U.S. 781, 806 (1946).
37. 234 Fed. 964, 1011 (S.D. N.Y. 1916); see also id. at 1012.
38. Id. at 978.
39. Id. at 1010
40. Id. at 994.
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the Supreme Court in refusing to give further relief to the Govern-
ment emphasized that "The International Company did not at any
time reduce its prices below replacement cost." This was in answer
to the argument of the Government that the International Com-
pany, with its large capital credit, resources, profitable sidelines,
and subsidiaries, was able, in times of depression, to sell its
machines at cost, generally lower than that of its competitors.
The Swift case emphasizes this fear of low prices. The defend-
ants had by consent been enjoined from dealing in groceries and
from engaging in the retail meat business. They now petitioned
for relief, pointing to changed conditions. One changed condition,
they wrote in their brief, was the new buying power of a quantity
purchaser. They said, "Because of the advent of the chain store into
the retail meat business, this buying power is now exercised
against the packing industry. '41 They quoted a witness who testi-
fied that "a person who has a buying power of five percent of the
available supply of meat is in a very advantageous position," and
they conclude, "There is no doubt that both Swift and Armour are
subject to the necessity of selling on a lower basis to chain organiza-
tions." The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia refused to
modify the decree with respect to retail operations, because, as
the opinion states, "The petitioners admit that if they go into the
retail business they must buy out many in the business, they will
necessarily compete with other retailers, now their customers, and
can by the elimination of salesmen and in other ways, reduce the
cost of their products to their own retail stores.142 Justice Cardozo
refused to permit the modification of the decree with respect to the
handling of groceries, in part, because the ownership of refriger-
ator cars and branch houses as well as other facilities, would enable
the defendants to distribute substitute foods and other unrelated
commodities "with substantially no increase of overhead.143
The force of the Swift case is, of course, lessened because Justice
Cardozo was interpreting the Sherman Act in the light of a petition
to revise a consent decree. Judge Hand in Alcoa44 relies on Swift
as a gloss on the Steel case, and quotes Cardozo's sentence that
"Mere size, according to the holding of this court, is not an offense
against the Sherman Act unless magnified to the point at which
it amounts to a monopoly." Yet the Swift case imposes restrictions
on the use of size where presently there was no monopoly, for
41. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 116, 117, United States v. Swift & Co. (D.C. Sup. Ct.
1931) (unreported).
42. Transcript of Record, p. 1058, United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106
(1932).
43. 286 U.S. at 118 (1932).
44. 148 F.2d at 430, quoting from 286 U.S. at 116.
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Justice Cardozo goes on to say in the opinion that the "meat mon-
opoly has been broken, for the members now compete with one
another. The size of the component units is substantially un-
changed." 4 5 The restrictions were imposed presumably to prevent
the abuse of size otherwise lawful, and a significant abuse would
have been low prices. Size, efficiency, fear of past aggression,
and the diffusion of responsibility which comes with size, are the
predominant themes of the opinion. The opinion serves to rein-
force the doubt expressed by Judge Lindley in the Atlantic and
Pacific case4 6 as to "whether we ever needed the Robinson-Patman
Law.. .," and unless the force of Swift has been changed by Alcoa,
the Swift case is a strong reminder that we have a two-level anti-
monopoly law.
Both the Corn Products and Swift cases involve problems of in-
tegration. The Corn Products Company was held to have gone into
the candy business at less than cost in order to impede the business
of the Clinton Sugar Refining Company, a subsidiary of the Na-
tional Candy Company, and to have attempted to have monopolized
the trade in mixed syrups. The government indeed charged that the
Company attempted to drive down the price of the main products,
meanwhile making up the profits necessary for their own dividends
by the sale of their package starches, grape sugar, and their other
specialties, and as to this Judge Hand states, "That the defendants
contemplated just such a maneuver and supposed themselves capa-
ble of carrying it out, their private correspondence abundantly
proves. '4 7 In the Swift case, the District Judge gave as one reason
for refusing to modify the decree to permit retailing, the testimony
of the president of Armour and Company.48 He testified that the
possession of the liberty to engage in that business would be use-
ful because "I can conceive of a situation developing around our
business where we have a customer of very large proportions,
with whom we are dealing in millions of dollars of business. I can
conceive of his buyer and my salesman getting into a situation of
antagonism one with the other, and of getting notice that that
man would not buy any more products from this great house of
Armour and Company.... I could not conceive of that ever hap-
pening if that big buyer thought that there was an opportunity,
because he or his people refused us his business, for us to go into
45. 286 U.S. at 117. Cf. Transcript of Record, p. 1057, supra note 42, where
Justice Bailey's opinion states: "Today the combination no longer exists; no one
alone of the packers is of sufficient size to constitute a monopoly, even if it tried
to do so....
46. United States v. New York Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp.
626, 676 (E.D. I1. 1946).
47. 234 Fed. at 985.
48. Transcript of Record, pp. 1058, 1059, supra note 42.
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the retail business. I cannot conceive that he would reach that con-
clusion."
Against this background, the Government's criminal action
against the New York Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company
appears less unusual. The Court of Appeals said4 9 that "one cannot
escape the conclusion," from the record, that A & P obtained pref-
erential discounts by threatening to put suppliers on a blacklist or
to go into the manufacturing business itself, and that it forced some
manufacturers to widen the spread between store door deliveries
and warehouse deliveries in order to preserve for itself the ad-
vantage of its warehousing system. It would not buy from suppliers
who sold to anyone through a broker. The Court of Appeals stated5 0
that "the record is replete with evidence of deliberate reductions of
gross profits in selected areas.... Sometimes the gross profit rate is
fixed so low that the store runs below the cost of operation ......
The District Court stated5' that in many instances "it was A & P's
definite program that the super market activities should eventually
enjoy 25% of the available business." Its sales of meat were fre-
quently at substantial loss.5 2 There was in addition some evidence,
as is undoubtedly inevitable, of particular abusive acts directed
by local managers at particular stores. It also appears that some
of the coercive measures were protective against powerful sellers.
The decisions in the A & P case have been criticized because of
their apparent adoption of the recoupment theory; namely, that
profits from one area or from the manufacturing business are used
to subsidize the retail stores. They have been criticized also because
of the apparent acceptance of the theory that sales by Acco, a
buying subsidiary, which also acted as a selling broker for the rest
of the trade on 30% of its business, gave to A & P not only the
advantage of not paying a broker's fee, but the benefits of the fees
paid in by its competitors. The latter theory, it is correctly said,
overlooks the fact that Acco performed a service and constituted an
investment. The recoupment criticism is based on the assumed fact
that any profit which A & P could make, it would have made in any
event, and that therefore the profit was not obtained in order to
subsidize a loss. Such inner-enterprise arrangements, however,
would not determine whether the business was deliberately con-
ducted at little or no profit in certain areas, and whether prices
were too low. In this respect the situation need not be different than
in the Corn Products case where recoupment was also claimed but
less successfully in that the opinion places no weight on it.
49. 173 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir. 1949).
50. Id. at 87.
51. 67 F. Supp. at 641.
52. Id. at 640.
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The A & P case is different from Corn Products because the per-
centage is considerably lower. It has been said by an economist 53
who has carefully studied the record that, with respect to A & P's
bargaining power and the claim that it forced people to drop their
tithes into its coffers, "perhaps this could be done by a purchaser
who occupied three to seven and one half percent of the markets
in which it operated. But most of us would like to know how." The
question implies that the percentage is too low to permit monopoly
power, although as a matter of fact some of the percentages are
said to be higher than five percent-a percentage testified to in the
Swift case (to be sure without much supporting evidence) as giv-
ing an "advantageous position."
A defense chart in A & p54 showed that in 1933 of the total
sales of stores engaged primarily only in sales of food at retail,
chain stores did 38.2% and A & P 11.6% and that in 1943, food
chains did 29.8%o and A & P did 7.1%o. The Government contended
that the picture was somewhat different in particular areas. In
the central division in 1941 there were eight cities where A & P
had more than 50% of the available business, 15 in which it had
from 40 to 50o, and 51 in which it had from 30 to 40o. In approx-
imately three-fourths of the cities in that division, it had more than
20% of the business. In 1948 its share in the total United States
food business was nine percent.
The Government, as reported in the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, did not in the criminal case attack A & P because of its
size, integration, or power, but rather because of its abuse of that
power. By analogy to the argument made by the critics of the
recoupment theory, and in keeping with the spirit of Alcoa, one
might argue that power, if it exists, will be exercised. This is
quite contrary to the line of argument followed by the Court of
Appeals. For example, it draws a line between large buying power
and the buying advantages which go therewith, and the abuse of
that power by threats to boycott and blacklist. 55 It might be
thought that the court's reliance on the recoupment theory is a
reliance on actual intent to monopolize; that is, for this case, to
do more than was accomplished. Such emphasis on intent as there
is, however, appears to be on the intent to do the acts which are
regarded as abuses, and such intent as may be implied from them.
The conspiracy to ,monopolize and to restrain are based on these
53. Professor M. A. Adelman, Integration and the Antitrust Laws, 63 HAgv.
L. REv. 27, 55 (1949).
54. See 67 F. Supp. at 633; Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States:
The Struggle between Independents and Chains, 99 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 1051, 1074
et seq. (1951).
55. 173 F.2d at 83, 87.
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abuses, and for the most part these are the securing and offering
of low prices, albeit in a particular way.
Judge Knox's opinion in the remand of the Alcoa case is very
much in this tradition of the fear of low prices and a law of unfair
competition. Operating under a mandate which the Judge con-
strued as making him search for what would be effective competi-
tion in the aluminum industry, Judge Knox was concerned with
the relative financial strength of the three integrated units, their
cost figures, and the possibility that low prices on the part of Alcoa
might preclude Reynolds and Kaiser from the business. In terms of
integration, he assumed the necessity for it,56 and in this respect
surely deviated from the theme of the Swift case. He found that
Alcoa had lost five million dollars in profits in 1948 by supplying
pig and ingot to the nonintegrated fabricators, but he thought that
this might be financially justified in the long run by a gain in good
will. 57 He treated Kaiser's arrangements to buy bauxite from
Alcoa as an arrangement by which "Kaiser may gain in the short-
run, but at the long-run sacrifice of independent integration....
The contract has the effect of profiting Kaiser's competitor, and
at the same time, it raises Kaiser's own costs of production above
that of its competitor."58 Possibly the suggestion is that this ar-
rangement is somewhat similar to the practices followed by A & P
with respect to its buying subsidiary which sold to its competitors.
Thus when it concerns the question of relief, the Alcoa case on
remand, perhaps under the stimulus of Reed's directive in Colum-
bia Steel, becomes a search for permitted power viewed through an
analysis of the possibilities of unfair competition.
Theory of Lawful Monopoly with Restricted Use
Under the present law, a monopoly, at least in the popular sense,
can exist and be regarded as lawful but its use restricted. The cate-
gory of "thrust upon it" in Hand's Alcoa opinion admits this. Jus-
tice Holmes in his dissent in the Northern Securities case pointed
out that "a single railroad down a narrow valley or through a moun-
tain gorge monopolizes all the railroad transportation through that
valley or gorge." 59 Justice Douglas in the Griffith case stated that
"anyone who owns and operates the single theatre in a town, or
who acquires the exclusive right to exhibit a film, has a monopoly in
the popular sense." 60 It is not an unlawful monopoly unless he has
56. See Comment, Vertical Integration in Aluminum: A Bar to Effective Com-
petition, 60 YALE L. J. 294 (1951).
57. 91 F. Supp. 333, 384 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
58. Id. at 371-2.
59. 193 U.S. 197, 406 (1904).
60. 334 U.S. 100, 106 (1948).
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illegally acquired it, or, on the other hand, to quote the opinion, un-
less he has "maintained his strategic position, or sought to expand
his monopoly, or expanded it by means of those restraints of trade
which are cognizable under section one." Thus if the theatre own-
er uses that "strategic position to acquire exclusive privileges in
a city where he has competitors, he is employing his monopoly
power as a trade weapon against his competitors. It may be a
feeble, ineffective weapon where he has only one closed or monopoly
town. But as those towns increase in number throughout a region,
his monopoly power in them may be used with crushing effect on
competitors in other places.16 1 Justice Douglas draws somewhat
the same distinction as the Court of Appeals in the A & P case
when he goes on to say that "large scale buying is not, of course,
unlawful per se. It may yield price or other lawful advantages to
the buyer." 62
The Griffith case is then a monopoly use case, where the monopoly
was lawful before its use, and where the effect of its use in a cer-
tain manner must be to restrain.63 That is to say in view of the
language in the Griffith case, and the finding by the District Court
that no competitors were driven out of business, or acquired by
appellees or impeded in their business by threats or coercion, it
would seem doubtful that some effect would not be presumed when
a closed town is tied to an open one. The Griffith case is therefore
very much like the tying of a patent to an unpatented item. And
wherever the monopoly can be assumed, as in a formal sense it
can be with a patent, this type of tying or exclusive arrangement
would seem to fit into an illegality per se category. To what extent
the only store in town or the only road down a narrow valley
would be the same as the only theatre is not clear, but there are
very broad implications flowing from the Douglas opinion.
The Lorain Journal case indeed deals with the activities of the
only daily newspaper in a town. The Supreme Court held that it
was a violation of Section 2 of the Act, for the newspaper to
refuse to accept advertising from customers because these custom-
ers also advertised through the competitive medium of a radio
station. Justice Burton analogized the case to a conspiracy between
all newspapers in a city to eliminate a competitive radio station
by accepting no advertising from anyone who advertised over that
station. Here there was a single newspaper "enjoying," Justice
Burton said, " a substantial monopoly in its area."64 There is no
61. Id. at 107.
62. Id. at 108.
63. See Rostow, Problems of Size and Integration, in CCH SYiiPosium ON Busi-
NESS PRACrIcES UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, 117, 122 (1951).
64. 342 U.S. 143, 154 (1951).
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suggestion that the existence of such a substantial monopoly
violates the rule of Alcoa; yet its use of its power becomes the basis
for a finding that it is attempting to monopolize to secure more.
Similarly the refusal of A & P to purchase from suppliers who in
previous instances "did not meet the prices dictated by A & P"
would have been a "boycott. . in and of itself... a violation of
the Sherman Act,"' 65 according to Judge Minton. The refusal of
the sole manufacturer of linen rugs to sell to a distributor in order
to make it impossible for that distributor to fulfill a government
order was likewise held to be a violation of Section 2 of the Act
in the Klearflax case. 66 These are instances where power and con-
duct otherwise lawful when joined together spell illegality.
The result is not too suprising. The law of price fixing was,
at least at one time, based not only on the conduct of the parties but
on their dominance over the market. The characterization of a re-
fusal to buy or sell as a boycott where there is monopoly power
has long been foreshadowed. The monopoly power so involved,
however, is not the monopoly power of Judge Hand's Alcoa opinion.
It is something less because it is not illegal per se; it is something
more because it is the basis for a developing law restricting the
uses of size or position. The Associated Press case67 is relevant.
While it may now be classified after the fact as an inmate of the
boycott category, along with Fashion Originators GuiZd68 and the
American Medical Association,69 since the arrangement was exclu-
sionary, the holding that members might not take into account the
ability of an applicant to compete with members in the same field
marks a new step in the law, only to be accounted for by the size
and strength of the combination. The step was moreover taken in
such a way as to almost foreclose consideration of what the past
actual effects of the combination had been and with a finding by
the District Court that the Associated Press did not monopolize
or dominate the furnishing of news, access to original sources of
news, or transmission facilities.7 0 The case is therefore a consider-
able extension of the St. Louis Terminal case71 which recognized
monopoly power and regulated it. The suggestion of Judge Wyzan-
ski in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.7 2 that it might
65. 173 F.2d at 87.
66. United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
67. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
68. Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
69. American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
70. See dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts, 326 U.S. at 29, 43; Lewin,
The Associated Press Division-An Extension of the Sherman Act?, 13 U. OF CIii.
L. REv. 247 (1946) ; Ellis, Paradoxes of the Associated Press Decision-A Reply,
13 U. OF Ciar. L. REv. 471 (1946).
71. United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
72. 92 F. Supp. 947, 963 (D. Mass. 1950).
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be a per se violation of Section One of the Sherman Act for dom-
inant firms in an industry to have joint factories, because this
would inevitably reduce their zeal for competition among them
in the American market, moves somewhat in the same direction in
that it points to the expansion or creation of categories in the
combination or conspiracy area where there is size or dominance.
The existence of a second level anti-monopoly law is therefore
not dependent upon the creation of some overall new category.
Many of the cases which point in the direction of curbs on per-
mitted monopoly power can be placed after the fact in some stand-
ard classification. The new trend stresses exclusion and there-
fore can work within, while expanding, the boycott category
and the concept of attempts to monopolize. It is aided also by the
growth of the conspiracy classification to concert of action size
where more or less independent firms of considerable power engage
in common action, and by the acceptance of conspiracies within the
corporate framework where it is one enterprise, as for example
in the General Motors case.78 The new trend, however, shows
unmistakable signs of attempting to create new categories as well,
as for example integration or tie-ins, in order to avoid a showing
of actual effect or of specific intent.
So far as vertical integration is concerned, the old Winslow
case74 is a direct holding that the integration of non-competing
units is not by itself illegal. Much has happened since then. The
integration cases cause no theoretical problem for the law when a
monopoly has been clearly achieved at one of the stages.75 This
was true in the Pullman case.76 It was also so in the old Standard
Oil case and in the Alcoa cases. In the Paramount case, it was
almost achieved by aggregating the major defendants into a
monopoly. Moreover, when annexed to monopoly power, there is
a reason for curtailing integration or tie-ins since they can result
in further barriers to entry to the market and also in a further ex-
ploitation of monopoly through price discrimination. 77
73. 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941).
74. United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
75. See Hale, Vertical Integration: Impact of the Antitrust Laws Upon Com-
binations of Successive Stages of Production and Distribution, 49 COL. L. REv. 921(1949); Comment, Vertical Forestalling Under the Antitrust Laws, 19 U. OF Cxi. L.
Ray. 583 (1952); Rostow and Sacks, Entry into the Oil Refining Business: Vertical
Integration Re-examined, 61 YALE L.J. 856 (1952).
76. 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
77. A type of loose integration, the exclusive arrangement, where the purchaser
agrees not to handle the goods of a competitor of the seller, has been brought into
what appears to amount to a per se category under the Standard Oil of California
[337 U.S. 293 (1949)] interpretation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. It would not
have been surprising if the same result had been reached in that case through
emphasis on the fact that all the other major suppliers individually "and at the
same time collectively, though not collusively" used the same system. For exclu-
sionary rules the law about collectivism may have moved to the place that Maple
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But integration and tie-ins may be unlawful when the monopoly
power to which they are annexed is itself legal. So viewed, the
law's concern with them is but part of a movement which recog-
nizes what is deemed to be lawful monopoly power and seeks to
find automatic curbs on abuses. It has been said that if integra-
tion is thus regarded as an abuse, "we shall bog down in moral
muddlement," for "if an abuse is an attempt to monopolize, that
attempt requires an intent to monopolize. '78 But integration may
be approached not so much as an attempt to monopolize but as an
abuse when connected with a restraint, which is the rule on relief
of Paramount, or an abuse by itself when it is the reaching out of an
enterprise with considerable power. The Griffith case holds that
under such circumstances no specific intent will be required in the
tie-in case, and despite the second Yellow Cab case, it would not
be much of a step to fasten the same conclusion on vertical integra-
tion under similar circumstances. These similar circumstances
would be a finding in an integration case, comparable to the finding
of restraint in Paramount, that there was the same amount of
monopoly power, or monopoly in a popular sense, as there was in
Griffith. The Columbia Steel case, which refused to find integra-
tion illegal in general, is not contrary to such an analysis, although
it leaves vague what amount of power would have to exist before
its use would be curbed.
The difficulty with the concepts of integration and tie-in is pre-
cisely the difficulty of determining what is to constitute such
monopoly power, even though the power may be lawful. It is
this difficulty which makes the concepts dangerous and deceptive,
for to find illegal integration or a tie-in is tantamount to a con-
clusion on the existence of monopoly power. For example, the
aggregation of buying power in the A & P case would be unlawful
automatically if the only store in an area were treated as an only
theatre. To the extent that the buying power of many stores is
aggregated in the A & P case, it is somewhat like the buying power
of the circuit in the Griffith case. Combining the manufacture of a
particular brand of coffee with the wholesaling and retailing of it
in the A & P case would be distinguishable from the General
Motors case, since the dealers in General Motors were independent,
but it could be urged that it is like the integration which the Depart-
ment of Justice tried to make illegal per se in the Columbia Steel
case. Under this kind of an analysis, integration and tie-ins will
Flooring [268 U.S. 563 (1925)] somewhat clumsily tried to take it for trade asso-
ciation statistical activities. But this is not to agree with the somewhat dismal
statement of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the Milwaukee Towne
case [190 F.2d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 1951)] that it "is difficult to visualize a case"
where evidence would not be sufficient to support a finding of conspiracy.
78. Hale, supra note 75, at 948.
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appear in almost every situation. The point is that integration and
tie-ins are only useful concepts when monopoly power of a sort is
deemed to exist and yet is thought to be illegal because used in
a particular way, and perhaps without a showing of specific intent
to monopolize. These concepts are a part of a developing second
level of anti-monopoly law.
Antitrust Relief Beyond Monopoly Power
A two level monopoly law can operate to decree divestiture when
other abuses or restraints have been found. At one time it was
fashionable to talk about relief in antitrust cases, as Brandeis
did-namely, an immunity bath. In the United Shoe Machinery
case, Justice McKenna asked in connection with the Goverment's
petition that the combination be dissolved, "will their monopoly
cease, or be regarded as an instrument of illegal purpose and for-
feited as a deodand?" 79 The question may have unwittingly presaged
at least a new turn in the law of relief. In the motion picture cases,
Justice Douglas has moved the law to where perhaps it can be said
that once abuses or restraints of the monopoly type have been
shown, the Court is directed to remove the fruits of the conspiracy
as well as to put an end to the combination and render impotent
its monopoly power. This together with the Celler amendment to
the Clayton Act represents a major change in the law. The Para-
mount case makes it clear that when there is a conspiracy to mo-
nopolize through restraints, the fruits achieved in the process which
fall short of monopoly must be removed. Justice Douglas derived
some solace from this change in his dissent in the Standard Oil of
California case, where in a footnote he comments on his own
opinions of this fashion, "Those cases have largely expended the
force of Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States ... an indefensible
decision where the Court allowed those who had built one of the
tightest monopolies in American history largely to retain their
ill-gotten gains and continue their hold on the economy."80 The
refusal of the Court to decree divestiture relief in the Timkin
case,8' however, suggests some limitations to the new doctrine.
The antitrust laws reflect conflicting purposes and doctrines.
They represent a common law of their own, but they carry with
them the history of an ancient common law, of rules to preserve
the market place and government regulation of all types, includ-
ing a goodly measure of price fixing. They are not the mirror of
79. 247 U.S. 32, 46 (1918).
80. 337 U.S. 293, 317 (1949).
81. Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); see United
States v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 96 F. Supp. 356 (D. Mass.
1951).
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one economic theory carefully carried into application. They are
somewhat limited of course by our own lack of knowledge, although
laws often proceed into areas where no one knows the answer.
There is lack of knowledge in our society with respect to what
goes on in industry and how it should be measured. This lack
of knowledge extends to the monopoly concept. The second level of
anti-monopoly law springs from our own uncertainties. Despite
Alcoa, monopoly power is regarded as existing and not unlawful.
In this gap the law moves to curb what are deemed to be abuses
and excesses. The trend arises to curb the dangers of monopoly
power; it carries with it its own dangers. The antitrust laws
have been a symbol of both competition and non-regulation. The
attempt to escape from too rigid rules, as reflected in the broaden-
ing influence of Justice Reed's dictum in Columbia Steel and its
application by Judge Knox in the remand of Alcoa, may have
joined with an overall concern with the excesses of permitted
monopoly power to turn the antitrust laws in the direction of
greater regulation.
